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Abstract. Secure systems are fiercely difficult to obtain - technical, pro-
cedural, human, and managerial aspects must be contemplated in a deep,
yet holistic approach, which is a complex task even for experienced informa-
tion security practitioners. Emerging information security “Assurance Cases”
methodologies, such as the military NATO AEP-67, promise (time) effective
practices for obtaining secure systems, making it a more reproducible process.
In this paper we are the first to report the effectiveness of the Assurance
Case methodology as a framework for teaching information security to both
individuals and teams.
1 Introduction
In spite of over 30 years of research, new information security issues of every nature
emerge in a growing rate. Indeed, achieving a secure system is arguably one of
the most difficult tasks practitioners may face in their professional lives. Having a
secure system demands a mix of procedural, technological, and scientific actions and
capabilities that few teams have and even fewer professionals master.
Because of mainstream educational practice limitations, forming professionals that
can handle both the comprehensiveness and depth necessary for success in information
security is a challenge. These reasons are further explored ahead in this paper.
In this paper we report how Assurance Cases were successfully employed as the
technical backbone of a course in secure system conception and implementation,
as a means to achieve a holistic approach in teaching information security to both
individuals and teams.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents related work, while Section
3 introduces the pedagogic model. In section 4 the Information Assurance Case
methodology is shortly introduced. The pedagogic model and the chosen assurance
methodology form the course syllabus, presented in Section 5. The class experience
and the experiment evaluation are reported in Section 6. Section 7 concludes and
presents future work.
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2 Related Work
Education in information security has been receiving attention for over a decade[15, 17].
In general terms, proposals can be classified with respect to four main aspects: duration,
scope, integration with other curricula, and the existence of an underlying framework.
Because information assurance is such a broad subject and transversal to most
IT-related major degrees, some authors consider that education in this area should
start in the freshman year and continue throughout the student’s formal education.
It may even be possibly offered as a major degree itself [16].
Although ideal, however, this approach requires re-thinking entire curricula, de-
manding time, effort, faculty mobilization, and other resources. Thus, single courses, or
workshop series are the prevailing approaches [13, 14, 18], as shown in a US survey [19].
When single, self-contained courses are considered, usually there is the need to
compromise either in terms of scope or lab practice: as shown in [19], most security
courses are in the form of lectures, even though hands-on classes were shown to
present very promising results [12, 11]. Also, it is important to note that the vast
majority of hands-on single class courses are either on attacks, security management
or risk assessment topics.
Our goal, however, is broader and builds upon the previous topics: the students,
as teams, should become competent on conceiving, designing, implementing, and eval-
uating secure systems. Of course, such an agenda may be hindered by time constraints
in a single term course and the inherent complexity of designing new systems.
To overcome these potential problems we adopted a double-edged approach: (a)
in order to cope with the challenge of students designing new systems, we adapted
a methodology for Electrical Engineering teaching based on product design [9, 10],
which provided a pedagogical framework for “students developing products”; and
(b) in order to cope with time constraints, we took advantage of the Assurance Case
Methodology’s ability to factor work among students (see section 4).
3 Pedagogic Model
Secure system conception, design and implementation is a complex task that requires
creativity and deep and wide knowledge of theoretical and practical aspects. Thus,
a traditional, purely narrative class, in the lines of what Freire called “The Banking
Concept of Education” [1], is not the most appropriate for teaching these subjects. Al-
though some concepts can and need to be explained to students, our hypothesis is that
real knowledge on information security is better internalized by means of experiencing.
For that reason, we employed on our course the concepts of Jean Piaget’s construc-
tivism [2] and, more extensively, the theory of Experiential Learning by David Kolb [3]
- where knowledge is gained by the appropriation and transformation of the students’
experience. And because information security problems are seldom well structured
and transversal to a broad range of areas, we were also inspired by Ivan Monsa˜o’s
learn-by-doing teaching methodology [9, 10], which precognizes that students must be
given small yet real problems to work with, in a “close coaching” methodology, so that
they may gain hands-on know-how (see Donald Scho¨n [4] and John Dewey works [5]).
4 Assurance Cases - AC
We quote from NATO’s Allied Engineering Publication #67 (AEP-67) [8]:
System assurance is the justified confidence that the system functions as
intended and is free of exploitable vulnerabilities, either intentionally or unin-
tentionally designed or inserted as part of the system at any time during the
life cycle. This ideal of no exploitable vulnerabilities is usually unachievable
in practice, so programmes3 must perform risk management to reduce the
probability and impact of vulnerabilities to acceptable levels.
The Assurance Case is the enabling mechanism to show that the system
will meet its prioritized requirements[. . . ] It is a means to identify all the
assurance claims, and from those claims (formally) trace through to their
supporting arguments, and from those arguments to the supporting evidence.
A key feature of ACs in general is that they support both quantitative and qualita-
tive formal analysis of evaluation criteria, and then combines arguments in a logically
structured way. ACs can be represented in different forms, depending on the objectives:
graphs (readability), formal language (easy of processing), semi-formal (easy of writing,
see figure 1). Assurance levels on claims can be presented as probabilities (calculated
by logical-probabilistic methods) or simply by labels from risk analysis. We chose
AEP-67 as our AC framework as it is both well-documented and a published standard.
A positive yet easy to overlook benefit of using assurance cases is the gained
ability to factor both analytical and implementation work on a per component, per
requisite (claim), per technology, or per life-cycle fashion, greatly reducing the need
for “super-professionals” (with wide and deep knowledge). This is a key enabler of
ACs as a methodological tool for education as we can focus on the team.
5 Course Syllabus
Once defined the technical and the educational methods we developed a syllabus where
the (bold) objective was to teach students most security aspects of the conception,
design and implementation of critical secure systems in a single-term course (60 class
hours over 4 months), so efficiency was a major concern. The course was offered both
at graduate and undergraduate levels to computer and electrical engineer students and
professionals. No specific prerequisites were set other than technical English proficiency.
The course started with 15 enrolled students and was organized in three parts:
(A) introduction to security sub-areas, (B) project development, (C) attacks to others
students’ systems.
Grades were calculated from five main indicators: (i) project adherence to the
security goals (claims) and functional requisites, (ii) related AC documentation quality
and completeness, with special attention to quantitative and qualitative evidences
and evaluation criteria; (iii) attack planning, execution and effectiveness; (iv) bonus
questions and quests on selected topics (v) and a final written exam.
3 A set of related measures or activities with a particular long-term aim: e.g. the British
nuclear power programme
– CLAIM A: “The software implementation abides to its specifications”, with
“medium assurance”
• “AND” SUB-CLAIM-1: “The software binary correctly corresponds to
the source code”, with “high assurance”
∗ CONTEXT-1.1: “All source code is interpreted as ISO/IEC 9899:1999
standard”;
∗ ARGUMENT-1.1: “The source code is compiled with a compiler
that correctly translates the source code to binaries” with “high
assurance”
· EVIDENCE-1.1: “The used compiler is CompCert, which is
formally verified”
· CRITERION: “Compiler with formal verification” for “high
assurance”
• “AND” SUB-CLAIM-2: “The source code abides to its specifications”,
with “high assurance”
∗ . . .
• . . .
– CLAIM B: . . .
Fig. 1. Text excerpt from an Assurance Case. Claim A is mid-level in terms of abstraction
and can be a sub-claim of a number of higher-level claims, such as “the system provides only
messages with origin authentication”. Of course, in order to hold, Claim A also depends
on a number of other factors (sub-claims), for example, to guarantee that the source code
provided to the compiler is indeed the one intended by the programmer. As a result, the
assurance level (or the probability of holding) for a claim with sub-claims is calculated by
the composition of probabilities. A complete AC, even for small systems, can have hundreds
of elements (claims, sub-claims, arguments, evidences, contexts, criteria, assumptions).
5.1 Part A - Introduction to security disciplines
This one month long part was basically a sequence of traditional lectures with two
objectives: (A) to rise the overall security awareness level, and (B) introduce the
Assurance Case Methodology. An important pedagogic objective was to move students
away from Burch’s [6] “unconscious incompetence” stage.
The program included: (i) security definitions, (ii) psychology and human factors,
(iii) laws and standards, (iv) cryptography, (v) defensive programming, (vi) malwares
and example attacks, (vii) side-channel attacks and hardware, (iix) discussion on a
sample system, (ix) AEP-67 assurance case methodology.
5.2 Part B - Project Development
At the end of Part A, students were instructed to form two groups around projects.
They were presented the option of proposing any non-trivial multi-user system of
their choice (for which the teacher would establish security goals) or choose between
two “messenger” projects, presented in Table 1, with a common general goal: to
provide secure message functionality for a limited-size community of users
Table 1. Proposed project details
Title “Spartan messenger” “Athenian messenger”
Allowed limita-
tions
Messages: text only, fixed-size, non-
formatted, no history, no message
delivery, No timing constraints
Text only messages, No timing
constraints
Supporting as-
sumptions
COTs semiconductors are free from
targeted menaces, One member per
team is trusted
Vanilla computing platform is free
from targeted menaces (e.g. factory
Android phone), One member per
team is trusted, Adversary cannot
act upon the hardware internals
Extras Keep message history Formatted messages, Voice messages
Security require-
ments (claims to
support)
Data confidentiality, Meta-data
confidentiality, Data integrity,
Origin and data authentication
Data confidentiality, Meta-data
confidentiality, Data integrity,
Origin and data authentication,
Plausible usage deniability, Replay
attack protection
Threat model Adversary has full power and
can do anything other than the
supporting assumptions, including
deploying spies
Adversary has full power and
can do anything other than the
supporting assumptions, including
deploying spies
Groups were formed and one leader per group was elected as point of contact
and sole “trusted” element on their groups – the class instructor announced that he
could covertly designate a team member (other than the leader) as a spy. This lead
students to consider inside-threats from day one on their projects, resulting on a very
rich security experience.
During two and half months, students were coached weekly (or twice a week upon
request) and both projects and assurance cases were reviewed. Also, students formed
e-mail groups for all internal project messages and included the instructor to promote
further proximity with them. Technical hints were given whenever sticky points were
identified either at live classes or on internal discussions on a close coaching but
without direct coding or designing being performed by the instructor.
5.3 Part C - Attacks
Once finished, students provided their resulting project in its “product form” to the
other team for security and functional evaluation. The sole provided documentation
were user manuals and the security goals “claimed” by each group for their solutions.
Prior to the beginning of the 10-day attack phase, the class instructor introduced
students on attack planning, attack surface and effort focus concepts so that they
could make the most of their time. Also, instructor insisted in experimentation as
a fundamental tool for success (and for learning).
At the end of the final phase, students had the opportunity to fix any security
issues of their solutions prior to final grade evaluation.
5.4 Course Conclusion
The course was concluded with a single exam with the following motto: “when security
is considered, more important than knowing a subject is the conscience of not knowing
it”. In Burch’s terms, to be unconscious of one’s own ignorance is much worse than
any other learning phase when it comes to security, as even a single missing aspect
is often fatal.
In that exam, although overall grades could range from 0 to 10, individual ques-
tions’ grades ranged from -32 to +16: students were free to choose only the questions
they fell comfortable with. This exam structure was carefully chosen so that pe-
nalization would not be counterproductive in pedagogic terms, while the nature of
information security and related tasks were preserved.
6 Results
6.1 Project and Assurance Case Results
Both teams were able to finish their projects without considerable delays. They
employed radically different techniques to achieve their goals with success, generating
a handful of creative solutions.
A noteworthy and validating aspect was their ability to conclude, from the assur-
ance case, industry best practices that naturally emerged during its compilation, such
as (i) the benefits of the reduction of the trusted computing base, in a minimalistic
approach (see Spartan messenger highlights bellow), (ii) the need for trusted designing
tools (see compiler sub-claims on AC excerpt from figure 1), (iii) the importance
of the supply chain (see section 6.3).
Table 2 summarizes key group achievements and project features and highlights
some characteristics.
Athenian messenger
– Stealth app launcher. In order to sustain “plausible deniability” the team
devised an app launcher scheme that presented no icons on the Android platform –
the application was triggered when a user configurable specific phone number was
dialed. The only app trace was a new running process at the device management
screen;
– Anti-permission leakage and interposition (Figure 2). The Android plat-
form allows for a number of interposition mechanisms so that regular keyboards
can be changed and even entire app screens can be precluded, representing a
serious threat. The implemented solution was twofold: (i) when launched, an
application scanned all device permissions looking for any hazardous interaction
and warning the user if any was found; and (ii) the application was packaged
with its own input method so that it was not threatened by rogue keyboards;
– Dummy server. Although a server was employed, its sole purpose was of
message relaying. Even if the server were compromised, all authentication (data,
origin) was performed by the devices themselves and no data breach would occur.
To make this possible, a QR-code-based approach was implemented as a means
for public-key exchange, when users were adding others to their contact lists;
– Voice messages. Groups implemented secure voice message functionality.
Spartan messenger
– Minimalistic approach. Because trust on components should be accompanied
by proper evidence, the group decided to have maximum control over their
platforms: they acquired Raspberry Pi boards (Figure 3) and stripped down a
Linux distribution specifically for this project. All designed applications were
minimalistic written in C language and any non essential feature was removed;
– Private key protection. Because private key protection was essential for data
and origin authentication, private key was protected by multiple mechanisms,
including full disk encryption. A good deal of creativity was employed when
individual private keys were embedded on per-user binary application.
– Assurance Case completeness. The Spartan messenger team produced a very
complete assurance case for their solution. Not only full lifecycle stages were
considered, but also good security evidences were provided.
– Resiliency. The proposed solution did not rely on any servers, making it im-
mune to some forms of DOS attacks. Because no scalability requirements were
set, the group chose a broadcast/multicast network architecture allowing the
implementation of strong metadata protection.
Fig. 2. figure
Athenian permission scanner
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argument will include context (the environment or conditions under which it is effective), which 
is shown as a separate component in Figure 2-3 to emphasize its importance. The sub-arguments 
of an argument are themselves arguments. To build an argument, evidence must meet criteria as 
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Fig. 3. figure
Spartan messenger hardware clients
Table 2. Key project and documentation results
Title “Spartan messenger” “Athenian messenger”
Chosen platform Raspberry Pi + stripped Linux Android phone
Architectural
approach
Minimal trusted computing base Security in layers
Cryptographic
techniques for
data in transit
Designed their own protocol using
standard primitives. OpenSSL
crypto library as core (SSL was not
used)
Mixed their own protocol with
Onion routing. GPG crypto core
Data at rest and
binary protection
No user data at rest. Protected
binaries by file system permissions
and full disk encryption
SQCipher for database protection,
with key derivation from user’s PIN.
Anti-metadata
and side channel
protection
Fixed size, fixed time package
transmission with broadcast.
Fixed size, fixed time package
transmission with relay server.
Highlights Assurance case naturally showed
strong security dependence over the
supply chain. Very complete assur-
ance case, split by lifecycle stage.
Android permission scanning prior
to application initialization, look for
rogue apps. Innovative app launch-
ing scheme for plausible deniability.
6.2 Attacks
Although only 10 days were given for attacking, teams deeply and consistently ex-
plored each others’ solutions, giving rise to a number attack trials: 19 for Spartan
team attacking Athenian app and 10 for Athenian team attacking Spartan solution.
Athenian Team on Spartan solution The attacks performed by the Athenian
Messenger Team were distinguished by their systematization and the ability to find
weaknesses (but not a violation) on the Spartan Messenger solution claims.
In terms of systematization, The Athenian Messenger Team organized potential
attacks depending on: (a) attack surface, (b) active vs passive adversary model, (c)
complexity, and (d) execution time. Of course, attack plans evolved while they learned
more about the Spartan solution.
They performed analysis on network traffic, hardware I/O interfaces, the Linux im-
age, and the application binaries, among others. They could find a sole marginal weak-
ness - although no security claim was violated: on the Spartan solution, a user sends
messages to other users using a command line application, passing message and receiver
as arguments (e.g. ./sender receiver name message). However, because the Spartan
Team forgot to disable the BASH history, past messages persisted on the .bash history
file – this is only a moderate problem given that full disk encryption was in place.
The BASH history problem was solved for the final solution version.
Spartan Team on Athenian solution The Spartan Messenger Team spent con-
siderable analytic and coding effort when attacking the Athenian Messenger. The
first step was to decompile the application package (APK) so that further knowledge
of the underlying cryptographic protocol was gained.
Although the protocol correctly addressed confidentiality, and data and origin
authentication, it was susceptible to replay attacks. So, the decompiled code was used
again, but this time to develop a Athenian malware that was able to perform replay at-
tacks if the adversary could manage to be included as a contact into others’ contact list.
This was a violation of one of the intended security claims for the Athenian solution.
Interview with the Athenian team showed what Monsa˜o calls “Aladdin Effect”
as one of the root causes of the protocol defect: taking autentication mechanisms as
black boxes instead of understanding their internals led to a deformed perception of
its behaviour. Once students were presented to the precise mechanism functionality,
they promptly corrected the protocol.
6.3 Student Perceived Evolution
In individual interviews, students reported that the Assurance Case methodology was
an essential tool for systematizing protection mechanisms’ coverage on their solutions.
In order to proper capture student perception of their evolution, we conducted an
anonymous and optional survey on their perception regarding seven relevant security
aspects, comparing the perception they had at the beginning and at the end of the
course. We used the Likert scale [7], with “1 for strong disagree”, and “9 to strongly
agree”. Concordance with the following assertions were evaluated:
1. “Information security is a multidisciplinary area”;
2. “Psychology [and social] aspects are fundamental to security”;
3. “The supply chain aspects are fundamental to information security”;
4. “Guaranteed security is a near impossible objective”;
5. “Managerial methodologies are fundamental do security”;
6. “Solution architecture is fundamental to security”;
7. “Secure development methodologies are fundamental to security”;
Figures 4 and 5 show the evolution for aspects 1 and 3 respectively, formatted as
histograms. Although the number of samples is small, the course’s influence is clear.
Table 3 shows statistics for all seven assertions for the general group and a cut with
only the students that work with security in a regular basis (professionals, with 4.8
year experience on average - 5 year median). There is no sensitive difference between
the general group and the second group: both groups had seen similar improvements.
7 Conclusion
Although complex, learning how to conceive, design and implement secure systems
can be achieved with a proper mix of baseline security awareness, coaching and
managerial methodology. In this paper we reported the first (to the best of our
knowledge) use of information assurance methodology as a backbone for security
teaching. Both self-perception evaluations (with Likert scales) and practical results
Fig. 4. Information security is a multidisci-
plinary area
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Fig. 5. The supply chain aspects are funda-
mental to information security
Table 3. Statistics for assertion submitted to Likert-scale evaluation by students. Cell
elements are organized n p irs: the firs number is the average and second is the median.
Popul ti 1 2 4 5 6 7
All b gin 6.8-7 6.7-7 6.0-6 5.2-5 5.9-6 7.8-8 6.8-7
All end 8.5-9 8.5-9 8.9-9 7.5-8 8.5-9 8.6-9 8.4-9
Pro begin 7.6-7 7.6-8 6.2-7 5.6-6 5.4-6 8.2-8 6.0-7
Pro end 8.8-9 8.4-8 9.0-9 7.4-9 8.2-8 8.6-9 8.0-9
showed that students were able to internalize hands-on knowledge on the subject.
Nevertheless, there is room for improvement - the attack phase was of intense learning,
but its duration was reduced: the development phase took considerable time and
closer schedule control would allow for smaller delays. Also, although course results
are consistent, the sample size in terms of students is small.
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